Another thought-provoking post, Bill. I see that you've been thoroughly enjoying UT's spring break (as I have mine), because this is the 4th post you've written this week. The last time you were this active on the Substack was when you first launched it last May, and for that we thank you. Today's post reminded me of a similar one you wrote back in September 2021 when we withdrew from Afghanistan (https://hwbrands.substack.com/p/altruism-and-interest?s=r). Discussing Ukraine with a friend last night, though, we chatted about why exactly America is taking such an interest into the Russo-Ukrainian War (as it had been christened on Wikipedia, the fount of all knowledge for my high school students) and not in other conflicts around the world (ex. the Tigray War in Ethiopia, the Yemeni Civil War). When it comes down to it, while America wants to be altruistic, at the same time, we are driven by self-interest. We care so much about Ukraine because (as you said), if Putin isn't stopped in Ukraine, then his ever-growing appetite might lead him (as he stated in Munich in 2007 https://aldeilis.net/english/putins-historical-speech-munich-conference-security-policy-2007/) to continue to eat up more former Soviet satellite states (ex. Poland, the Baltic States). And once Putin enters Poland, that triggers Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and (in theory) America has to get directly involved. We have no such mutual defense alliance with Ethiopia or Yemen which would obligate us to get involved in their conflicts. And while I am wholeheartedly in support of Ukraine, at the same time, how much of this conflict is America's fault? George F. Kennan (architect of the Containment Doctrine during the Cold War) wrote in the NYT in 1997 (https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html) that by expanding NATO to Russia's borders (ex. Poland, the Baltic States) following the collapse of the USSR, the decision would be "expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking." Kennan had originally explained the dangers of surrounding the USSR with military alliances in "The Long Telegram" (https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-long-telegram/), which were subsequently fulfilled with the creation of NATO in 1949 & then Eisenhower's pactomania (SEATO & METO). Yes, ultimate blame for invading Ukraine falls on Vladimir Putin, but how much fuel has the U.S. provided that helped start the blaze, and how far are we willing to go to aid Ukraine, a non-NATO country?
When a newly independent Poland or Latvia says we love democracy and we'd like to join the democratic club's alliance, it's hard for a U.S. president to say no. That would be to give autocratic Russia a veto over NATO membership - which might be a good idea but is a tough sell politically. The other question is how sensitive Putin really is to external influences and how much the current war follows from his desire to strengthen his own regime politically. If NATO hadn't advanced eastward, would Putin not have worried about Ukraine's independence? I don't know the answer to this, and we'll never know.
Another thought-provoking post, Bill. I see that you've been thoroughly enjoying UT's spring break (as I have mine), because this is the 4th post you've written this week. The last time you were this active on the Substack was when you first launched it last May, and for that we thank you. Today's post reminded me of a similar one you wrote back in September 2021 when we withdrew from Afghanistan (https://hwbrands.substack.com/p/altruism-and-interest?s=r). Discussing Ukraine with a friend last night, though, we chatted about why exactly America is taking such an interest into the Russo-Ukrainian War (as it had been christened on Wikipedia, the fount of all knowledge for my high school students) and not in other conflicts around the world (ex. the Tigray War in Ethiopia, the Yemeni Civil War). When it comes down to it, while America wants to be altruistic, at the same time, we are driven by self-interest. We care so much about Ukraine because (as you said), if Putin isn't stopped in Ukraine, then his ever-growing appetite might lead him (as he stated in Munich in 2007 https://aldeilis.net/english/putins-historical-speech-munich-conference-security-policy-2007/) to continue to eat up more former Soviet satellite states (ex. Poland, the Baltic States). And once Putin enters Poland, that triggers Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and (in theory) America has to get directly involved. We have no such mutual defense alliance with Ethiopia or Yemen which would obligate us to get involved in their conflicts. And while I am wholeheartedly in support of Ukraine, at the same time, how much of this conflict is America's fault? George F. Kennan (architect of the Containment Doctrine during the Cold War) wrote in the NYT in 1997 (https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html) that by expanding NATO to Russia's borders (ex. Poland, the Baltic States) following the collapse of the USSR, the decision would be "expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking." Kennan had originally explained the dangers of surrounding the USSR with military alliances in "The Long Telegram" (https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-long-telegram/), which were subsequently fulfilled with the creation of NATO in 1949 & then Eisenhower's pactomania (SEATO & METO). Yes, ultimate blame for invading Ukraine falls on Vladimir Putin, but how much fuel has the U.S. provided that helped start the blaze, and how far are we willing to go to aid Ukraine, a non-NATO country?
When a newly independent Poland or Latvia says we love democracy and we'd like to join the democratic club's alliance, it's hard for a U.S. president to say no. That would be to give autocratic Russia a veto over NATO membership - which might be a good idea but is a tough sell politically. The other question is how sensitive Putin really is to external influences and how much the current war follows from his desire to strengthen his own regime politically. If NATO hadn't advanced eastward, would Putin not have worried about Ukraine's independence? I don't know the answer to this, and we'll never know.