What's a president to do? Washington and neutrality

George Washington was not a lawyer, nor did he think in the legal terms that came naturally to the many lawyers who were delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Washington was not a philosopher, nor was he fluent in the philosophical concepts favored by Thomas Jefferson, his secretary of state. Washington was definitely not a political climber, and the naked ambition of Alexander Hamilton, his treasury secretary, was foreign to his very nature.

But Washington was the first president under the Constitution of 1787, which charter had merely sketched the outlines of presidential responsibility, largely because its framers assumed Washington would be America's first chief executive and would figure things out as he went along.

Now he had to figure out one very big thing. The revolutionary government of France had just declared war on the reactionary government of Britain. France immediately appealed to the United States for assistance, on the basis of the alliance that had connected the two countries during the War of the American Revolution and which still remained in force. Besides, said the French, the world’s few republics had to stick together.

Britain, too, appealed for American favor. The British cited ties to America of longer standing: of culture and history and commerce. Republicanism might link America to France, the British acknowledged, but the bloody French version was nothing to boast about. The rule of law—the common law that America had adopted from Britain—was a sturdier basis for cooperation. If America helped anyone, the British said, it ought to help Britain.

Both France and Britain punctuated their appeals with naval force. The French seized American merchant vessels bound for Britain and confiscated their cargoes. The British did the same with American vessels bound for France. In the process the British arrested and carried away sailors they claimed had deserted from the British navy.

Washington’s administration protested the seizures. The protests consisted chiefly of letters by Jefferson to the French and British governments. The United States navy was not yet in condition to take on the navies of the European powers. The French and British ignored Jefferson’s complaints and continued their depredations.

Jefferson resented the British lack of response more than the French. Jefferson had a soft spot in his heart for France, on account of the aid the French had given to the cause of American independence. Hamilton, meanwhile, resented France more than Britain, which Hamilton admired for the energy and stability of its government.

As things happened, the outbreak of the European war coincided with the emergence of political parties in the United States. Hamilton's party, the Federalists, favored a strong national government and catered to the interests of the merchant classes in America. The Federalists wanted to cultivate commercial ties with Britain, and they were frightened by the chaos triggered by the French revolution. Jefferson's party, the Republicans, were mostly farmers who looked to the states rather than the national government. The Republicans still distrusted Britain a decade after the end of the Revolutionary War, and they explained away the violence in France as a regrettable but understandable outgrowth of needed changes in that country.

Washington regretted and resisted the emergence of parties in America. He didn’t want to have to choose between Hamilton and Jefferson. Nor did he want to choose between Britain and France in a war that had nothing intrinsically to do with American interests.

So Washington took a step that was politically dicey and of dubious constitutionality. Without consulting Congress, the president proclaimed American neutrality. “The duty and interest of the United States require that they”—the United States—"should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers," Washington said.

Washington's proclamation drew criticism from all directions. The French cried betrayal by an ally they had nurtured to independence. The British accused the Americans of complicity in the bloodbath of the French revolution. The Federalists had thought Washington secretly sided with them; the neutrality proclamation revealed their mistake. The Republicans said Washington’s rejection of France cast a shadow over America’s good faith.

The Republicans had another complaint. They accused the president of unconstitutionally intruding on the authority of Congress. The Constitution, while silent on proclaiming neutrality, reserves to Congress the power to declare war. The Republicans contended that any declaration of non-war—neutrality— likewise had to come from Congress.

Washington was no Machiavelli calculating every angle of each action. Indeed, he prided himself on his straightforwardness. But he understood how political power worked. He saw that there was no groundswell for war among the American people. He reckoned that neither Britain or France was positioned to force the United States to join its side. He supposed Congress, if consulted, would debate the advisability of war for weeks or months without reaching a conclusion. He could tell that the critics of his overstepping the Constitution had no leverage to do anything about it.

He was right on each count. His neutrality proclamation caused a fuss but nothing more. The United States stayed out of the war between Britain and France, and Washington stayed out of the squabble between Federalists and Republicans. 

Yet that wasn’t the end of the story. Washington’s stretch of the Constitution in favor of the executive branch had long-term ramifications. Andrew Jackson, who was often called the second Washington after the Battle of New Orleans, as president defied the legislative and judicial branches. Abraham Lincoln used presidential war powers to do something the framers of the Constitution had never intended for a president to do: free the slaves. Harry Truman turned the Constitution on its head by taking America to war in Korea without even asking Congress for a war declaration.

Truman’s action caught on. From Truman's time until the present, Congress has never declared war. But the U.S. military, on presidential orders alone, has fought wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq, and has conducted lesser military operations in many other countries. Congress has been demoted from its central constitutional position on matters of war to mere bystander.

It all started with Washington, even if he couldn’t see where it would lead.