Things could be worse

When problems can’t be solved, manage them

How will the Israel-Palestine situation be resolved? A two-state solution? One-state? How will the war between Russia and Ukraine end? A negotiated solution? How will the China-Taiwan question be settled? By a one China, two systems finesse? One China, one system? One China, one Taiwan?

It's natural to think of concerns in international affairs in terms of problems. And it's understandable to want to find solutions to problems. This is especially true for a great power like the United States, which involves itself in most of the world's troubles. Even America can’t juggle a dozen balls forever.

A problem-solving approach also reflects American history. America's long isolation from the struggles of Europe and Asia caused Americans to think of wars as anomalies in a background of peace. There was self-deception in this attitude, for it neglected the chronic conflict between Euro-Americans and Native Americans. Nonetheless, Americans viewed themselves as a peace-loving people who occasionally and reluctantly went to war. The fighting typically resolved whatever problem gave rise to the conflict, and peace resumed.

The pattern persisted through the first half of the 20th century. America's involvement in the First World War Iasted 18 months; America's heavy lifting in the Second World War took about twice that long. Each war ended in a clear victory for the American side. America demobilized quickly after each war.

Then things changed. America remobilized during the Cold War, and it has remained on a war footing ever since. During the 40 years of the Cold War, American thinking about the world shifted from solving problems to managing them. The new attitude applied, at any rate, to America's principal problem: the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon normalized the Cold War via the policy of detente.

But the policy chafed conservatives. Ronald Reagan and others denounced the live-and-let-live philosophy of detente; Reagan put his policy toward the Soviet Union simply: “We win, they lose." When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Reagan's approach appeared vindicated, as did the traditional American habit of treating foreign policy challenges as problems to be solved.

At first the retro approach seemed more plausible than ever. As the sole superpower, the United States should have been able to solve problems easily. Yet the problems were many and diffuse, unsuited to the tools developed for the bipolar contest with the Soviet Union. From the Balkans to the Caribbean to the Horn of Africa and China, America spent the 1990s swatting at flies, comparatively speaking, and mostly in vain.

Things got worse in the 21st century. The theme of American policy after September 11, 2001, was the war on terror; the name alone should have indicated how frustrating things would become. Weapons don't work against ideas; a strategy of asymmetrical warfare can’t sue for peace. America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved expensive failures.

Which brings us to the present. Talk of a solution to the problem of Israelis and Palestinians might be psychologically and politically necessary, but it ignores much of what has happened in the last 75 years. Prudence lies in managing the problem. Don't let it blow up into a larger war; don't let it drag Americans further into a conflict that doesn’t directly threaten the United States. And don’t be surprised if the problem remains unresolved 75 years from now.

A similar attitude should inform American policy toward Russia. Vladimir Putin's country is declining, but no faster than its neighbors. Russia will remain the primary power in the region for decades. And it won’t be giving up its nuclear weapons. Putin won't live forever, but he hasn't been governing alone. His successor might very well share his views regarding Russian interests. Unless the United States wants to police the longest land border in the world—a hopeless policy if ever there was one—American leaders are going to have to hunker down for a long stretch of managing Russia without starting a nuclear war.

As for China and Taiwan, wisdom lies in kicking this can down the road, and doing it again and again and again. Perhaps China’s growth is slowing, but China will remain much bigger and stronger than Taiwan for many generations. And it will always be much closer to Taiwan than America is. The status quo of the last fifty years isn’t ideal. But it’s worked well enough that none of the parties has felt compelled to disrupt it. American leaders should do what they can to avert such compulsions. The problem might not be solved, but the problem is preferable to any of the likely solutions.

“Things could be worse” doesn’t resound like a clarion. Sometimes it simply makes sense.