The secret life of alliances

An unfriendly future?

In the 1960s American leaders bent their brains into pretzels trying to keep Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. America had nukes, the Soviet Union had nukes, Britain had nukes, France had nukes, and of late China had nukes. Americans assumed Germany, as a self-respecting nation, would insist on joining the nuclear club.

Washington proposed an alternative, the Multilateral Force, or MLF, which would include German personnel among American, British, and French on board submarines carrying nuclear weapons. The planning was a headache, involving multiple languages and military cultures.

It turned out to be unnecessary. The Germans decided they didn't want nukes, which would make them a more tempting target for Soviet nukes. American leaders sighed with relief. European memories of what Germans had done with powerful weapons in World War II were still raw. Calming the alarm around the continent would have been difficult and time-consuming.

A deal was struck. Germany would remain dependent on the United States for defense, and the United States wouldn't have to worry about Germany going rogue again.

There was one flaw in the arrangement. No one informed the public of the terms of the deal. No American leader and no German leader was willing to say that the NATO alliance was as much about containing German ambitions as it was about deterring Soviet aggression. Insiders understood the deal. British and French diplomats mumbled a formula saying that the purpose of NATO for Europe was to keep “the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” But the adage never appeared in official communiques.

One result was that Americans often felt they were paying more than their fair share of NATO expenses. Voters and members of Congress demanded that Germany and other NATO countries pay more. Presidents and secretaries of state tried to ignore the demands without revealing the essence of the bargain. The demands diminished as voters and legislators were distracted by other gripes.

Donald Trump revived them in his 2016 campaign for president. He threatened to revoke America's defense commitment to members of NATO who failed to increase their contributions. His threat grew more serious after he won the 2016 election. Several alliance members did increase their defense spending. It was their turn to sigh relief when Trump failed to be reelected in 2020.

Their worries are back. The Europeans are already discussing how to deal with an unpredictable president distrustful of alliances. The upshot of the discussions is that Europe will have to become more self-sufficient in defense planning. Whether this will include nuclear weapons for Germany is unclear.

Yet the underlying issue is the same. The more self-reliant Germany and other members of NATO become, the more independent they will be of the United States. America's promise to defend Europe has given it leverage with European decision-making. If the promise disappears, so will the leverage.

No one expects that this will lead to a Europe hostile to the United States. At least not in the near term. But owing little to America, European diplomats will do little for America. They will chart their own courses toward Russia, China, Iran and Israel. Their courses will not always parallel America’s. American economic sanctions will become less effective. America will more often be isolated at the United Nations.

Various statesmen over time have pointed out that great nations don’t have friends, only interests. Yet nations with common interests can be friendly. Without the common interests, they might not be even that.