Perilous promises

Unpopular wars

Tim Hardin probably wasn’t thinking of Vietnam when he released his 1966 song “Don’t Make Promises.” But by the end of the decade, when the song had been recorded by a dozen other artists, the refrain “Don’t make promises you can’t keep” seemed an apt criticism of American policy in Southeast Asia.

It’s good advice for people in general. And it’s as pertinent to foreign policy as ever. With the war in Ukraine dragging on, some pundits are suggesting that Ukraine be admitted to NATO as part of a deal to end the conflict. This would be the carrot to get Ukraine to call it quits, and it would be the stick to keep Russia from thinking it had won. It would also be balm to the consciences of Ukraine supporters in America and elsewhere who might otherwise feel they were abandoning the country they had tried to defend.

Yet it’s a very bad idea. In the first place, the current government of Russia would never agree to it. One doesn’t have to believe everything Vladimir Putin says to take seriously his assertion that the war in Ukraine is about holding back the frontier of NATO, among other things. Russia is currently winning the war, but even if it weren't, Putin wouldn’t voluntarily relinquish such a central war aim.

Second, extending NATO’s promise of defense to the heart of the former Soviet Union would sow the seeds of destruction of the alliance. Donald Trump has an even chance of being the next president. If elected in November, he will quickly terminate talk of Ukraine membership for NATO. But even if he loses to Kamala Harris, his questioning—to put it mildly—of American support for Ukraine will have resonated with almost half the American electorate. For a Harris administration to move ahead on admitting Ukraine to NATO would be reckless. If admitted, Ukraine couldn’t be kicked out, but the president after Harris could pull the United States out of NATO. That would be the end of the alliance.

Membership for Ukraine might destabilize much of Europe. Events of the 1930s show how this could happen. The peace settlement after World War I imposed onerous burdens on Germany. America rejected the settlement by refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Many even in Britain and France thought the settlement unrealistic. And so when Adolf Hitler in the 1930s challenged and overturned various parts of the settlement, the British and French couldn’t muster the conviction to stop him. Hitler pushed harder, demanding return of a part of Czechoslovakia that had been carved out of prewar Germany. Britain and France chose not to contest the issue by force. But after Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia, London and Paris promised to defend Poland, the country next on Hitler’s list.

Hitler’s claim on Poland was similar to his original claim on Czechoslovakia, namely that part of it had been stolen from Germany in the post-World War I settlement. He cut a deal with Joseph Stalin to divide Poland, some of which had been taken from pre-war Russia.. In September 1939 German troops marched into Poland.

Britain and France felt obliged to declare war on Germany. Germany had not attacked them. Hitler had not directly threatened them. But they had given their promise, and they had to try to keep it.

They couldn’t. They weren’t militarily prepared to fight Germany. And Poland was a most unpromising place for them to mount an attack. They spent the winter of 1939-40 doing nothing.

Yet having declared war on Germany, they gave Hitler all the excuse he needed to go after them. France fell within six weeks in the spring and early summer of 1940. Britain would have gone down too if not for the intervention of the United States, in the form of massive American aid and then of millions of American troops and thousands of ships and planes.

In American thinking, World War II ended well. Hitler was defeated, and the United States stood supreme. This is true as far as it goes. But it’s hardly a recommendation for making promises you can’t keep. The lesson, as it applies to Ukraine, is just the opposite. The war against Germany turned out well because Britain and France had America to bail them out. And getting to the positive final result entailed the most destructive war in human history.

A NATO promise to Ukraine would be an American promise. And there’s no country to bail America out. Moreover, no one wants to fight World War III over Ukraine. Certainly no one in the United States wants to do so. Russia is an annoyance to the United States, not an existential threat. And not something worth fighting a major war over. 

But Russia might well consider America an existential threat if it makes a NATO ally of Ukraine. Russia might deem Ukraine worth fighting America over. Should America follow through on its commitment to Ukraine, it would find itself in a war with Russia it didn't intend and didn't want. If blundering into such a war isn't a failure of leadership, nothing is. 

In the 1930s, Congressman Louis Ludlow of Indiana proposed an amendment to the Constitution requiring a national referendum before the United States went to war. Ludlow's amendment allowed an exception for cases when the United States was attacked. But otherwise the people of the United States would have to choose war directly. Ludlow didn't trust the government to make a decision on war that truly reflected the wishes of the American people, the ones who would have to fight the war.

The proposed amendment never made it out of Congress, seeming too radical a departure from precedent and practice. Critics said or implied that ordinary Americans weren't capable of making wise decisions on such an important matter as war. As a result, Americans do not get to vote directly on whether we go to war. 

But we do vote on whether we stay in a war. Wars that last more than a couple of years tend to show up on the ballot in presidential elections. Until the last minute, Abraham Lincoln thought he was going to lose the 1864 election on account of the slow progress of the Union army in defeating secession. Eleventh-hour battlefield victories raised spirits in the north and carried Lincoln to reelection. Lyndon Johnson was driven to abandon his re-election effort in 1968 largely on account of dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war. 

In no small degree, the Ukraine war is on the ballot in the current election. A vote for Donald Trump is presumptively a vote against American support for Ukraine. Trump will certainly get at least 45 percent of the popular vote. Even if he loses, that bloc of anti-Ukraine votes ought to give the new Harris administration pause.

Obviously no offer of NATO membership to Ukraine will be made before November. But even after, it would be risky. A promise by American officials to defend Ukraine might quickly turn into a promise the American people wouldn’t let them keep.