After Trump?

Expect a reversion to the mean

America has never had a president quite like Donald Trump. For this reason the presidential historian has no particular advantage over other pundits in predicting what he will do. Raise tariffs? Lower tariffs? Cut a deal with Iran? Cut a deal with Russia? Cut a deal with China? Defy the Supreme Court? Test the 22nd Amendment and try for a third term?

The one thing that can be said with certainty about Donald Trump is that he will not be president forever. His presidency will expire before he does or when he does. He will not be president from beyond the grave.

He might try, in the sense of anointing a successor. How will that turn out?

Here the historian has somewhat firmer ground to stand on. Several presidents have tried to extend the spirit of their presidencies through their successors. The efforts have generally failed.

Thomas Jefferson strove mightily to avoid involvement in a longrunning war between Britain and France, to the degree of persuading Congress to cut off exports in an effort to make those countries cease their depredations on American shipping. The Embargo Act of 1807 was ruinous for the American economy, creating a mess for James Madison, Jefferson's chosen heir, who found himself and the country sucked into the very war Jefferson tried to avoid.

Andrew Jackson hoped his populist appeal would rub off on his vice president and selected successor, Martin Van Buren. Precisely the opposite occurred. The traits that made Van Buren useful to Jackson — his mastery of the political system and his ability to bring warring factions of the Democratic party together — were the opposite of those that had made Jackson — a political outsider who was more lightning rod than unifier — popular. Like Jefferson with Madison, Jackson left Van Buren a mess: a real estate bubble fueled by Jackson’s feud with big bankers, which produced the panic of 1837 and an ensuing depression.

Theodore Roosevelt went on safari in Africa in 1909, confident that progressivism was in good hands with William Howard Taft, who coasted into the White House with TR’s benediction. Roosevelt discovered his mistake before long. Taft hadn't misled Roosevelt so much as allowed Roosevelt to mislead himself. When Roosevelt concluded the Taft was not the progressive Roosevelt had thought him to be, he destroyed Taft's presidency by challenging him for the Republican nomination in 1912 and then, upon failing to receive the nomination, running on the ticket of a third party, the Progressives. Roosevelt's fracture of the Republicans opened the door to Democrat Woodrow Wilson.

George H. W. Bush didn't have the 1988 nomination handed to him by Ronald Reagan. Yet after Bush beat back several other GOP hopefuls, his victory in the general election was more a reflection on Reagan than on him. Nor was Bush an incompetent president. He guided the world to a soft landing at the end of the Cold War. He put the federal budget on track to balance. But he lacked Reagan’s charisma, the personal magic which caused people who disliked Reagan's policies to like Reagan himself. Indeed, Bush had the opposite effect on people: many who liked his policies couldn't bring themselves to vote for him. He lost his race for reelection in 1992.

Madison, Van Buren, Taft and Bush exemplify the challenges facing candidates who ride their predecessors' popularity into the White House. That very popularity worked against them. Jefferson, Jackson, Roosevelt and Reagan were tough acts to follow, for two reasons.

First, voters form a personal attachment to popular presidents that isn't readily transferable. If anything, the popularity of a predecessor can make voters resent the successor for trying to take the place of the hero. Van Buren wasn't a bad president but he was no Old Hickory. Bush was a good president but no Reagan.

Second, the policies that contributed to the popular presidents’ popularity can have troublesome consequences for their successors. Jefferson’s embargo seemed a good idea at the time it passed Congress, but it ensnared Madison. Jackson’s partisans thrilled at his thumping of the bankers, but they felt the pain of the ensuing depression.

Donald Trump will be a tough act for any Republican successor to follow. His supporters are devoted to him personally, not to his policies, as demonstrated by his ability to reverse policy course without lessening his supporters’ attachment to him. This kind of personal bond occurs maybe once in a lifetime, like first love. It won't be available to Trump's successor.

Moreover, the policies Trump is putting in place might very well produce a backlash against a successor. Tariffs are raising Americans' cost of living. Trump’s attack on government is depriving people of services they've come to depend on. Charges of corruption against administration officials and against Trump himself are likely to mount.

In fact it's premature to talk about Trump's chosen successor, because by 2028 he might not be popular enough to have the choosing to himself. A competitive race for the Republican nomination would break any remaining Trump spell and relegate even the winner to the ranks of ordinary politicians.

Presidents with the appeal of Jackson, TR and Reagan have appeared rarely in American politics. Twice in a row? Never.