A social contract for nations?

 

Over the course of our evolution, we humans figured out how to balance liberty against security. In the tribes and societies we grouped ourselves into, we traded some of our liberty for greater security. The strong were not allowed simply to dominate the weak. They were subjected to social constraints that kept their behavior within bounds. These constraints were enforced by the collective will. The constraints were often greater on the weak than on the strong, but the weak gained more from the regime of constraint, for they were less able than the strong to defend themselves. The strong agreed to the constraints because though individually powerful, they were outnumbered by the many.

This was the social contract. It worked better in some societies than in others. In certain places its terms were written down. In others the terms were unwritten norms and expectations.

Whatever the precise form, the social contract was the defining characteristic of civilized society. People didn't walk around in constant fear of personal violence. Property received protection. The clearer the terms of the social contract, the more smoothly the societies operated. The terms were different in a monarchy than in a republic. But both systems, and others, survived and sometimes thrived.

The idea of the social contract applied within societies. It never caught on between societies. Various attempts were made. Among the first were empires. These were the international equivalent of monarchies, with power flowing from the top down and the center outward. Successful empires imposed peace between the societies within their imperial boundaries. In the days of the Pax Romana, Roman legions suppressed violence between neighboring tribes and peoples in the greater Mediterranean region. Under the Ottoman empire, diverse ethnicities and confessional groups were compelled to keep their social and religious views more or less to themselves.

Empires fell out of favor in the 20th century. They were replaced by voluntary aggregations of societies. First the League of Nations and then the United Nations operated under charters that attempted to be international social contracts. The League of Nations was stunted at birth by the refusal of the most powerful country in the world, the United States, to join. The United Nations has been hampered by the special consideration accorded the five permanent members of the security council, each of which can veto measures inimical to its interests.

Why the failure to extend the principle of the social contract to the international realm? The immediate answer is that the powerful states have refused to submit themselves to the authority of the collective of states. 

Yet at the national realm, powerful individuals submit themselves to the collective of individuals. Not perfectly, and often not willingly, but sufficiently that most societies do not devolve into warlord rivalries.

The difference would seem to lie in our evolutionary past. We humans evolved as a social species. We learn to tolerate one another within the limits of our band, our tribe, our nation. At the same time, we learned to distinguish between our tribe and other tribes, reflexively viewing the latter with distrust and hostility. We seem not to have evolved past this point.

When our leaders call upon us to act in the interest of our group—that is, when they summon our patriotism—we are wired to respond positively. When they call upon us to act in the interest of other groups, our reflexes work against a positive response. Competing leaders have little difficulty appealing to this distrustful reflex, dooming much chance at voluntary cooperation. Involuntary cooperation can be elicited, as in an empire or on the part of weaker members of an umbrella group like the United Nations, but the key players—the powerful nations—prefer to take their chances on their own.

We’ll have to evolve longer before we develop the reflex for international cooperation.

In the meantime, circumstances might occasionally compel even the powerful to submit to the interests of the species as a whole. Until covid-19, the world made cooperative progress against infectious diseases such as polio and smallpox. The world pays at least lip service to the concept of nuclear nonproliferation. International peacekeepers have kept numerous low-grade civil conflicts from flaring into all-out war.

Climate change is proving a sterner test. Rich countries can shield themselves from the consequences of climate change. Skeptics and cynics can readily mobilize opposition to policies that entail costs.

Yet even rich countries can't escape the consequences entirely. They might eventually conclude that their interests lie in cooperation.

Should we learn to cooperate on climate, we can tackle our much older scourge: war. But that might require a bit more evolution.